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Abstract: By taking stock of the current state of climate pol-
icy, we conclude that both energy policy and the closely
tied climate policy deserve an upgrade from level 1.0 to
2.0. There are many reasons which motivate this shift. In-
ternational climate policy, despite the hailed Paris Agree-
ment of 2015, is still lacking credible commitments. Only
a last minute effort for ratifying this agreement before it
entered into force saved the European Union from a dis-
graceful loss of face. Meanwhile, however, we observe
record highs both in global temperatures and concentra-
tion of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. In view of this
rather shaky stateof climatepolicy, weelaborate thepropo-
sition that decisions about energy and climate will be less
forged by policy decisions but rather driven by disruptive
innovations backed by business interests.
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Ein Upgrading für die Klimapolitik von simplistischen
Empfehlungen für Dekarbonisierung zu einem
umfassenden Carbon Management
Zusammenfassung: Eine Bestandsaufnahme des aktuellen
Zustands der Klimapolitik lässt uns schließen, dass sowohl
die Energiepolitik als auch die eng verknüpfte Klimapolitik
ein Upgrade vom Level 1.0 auf 2.0 verdienen. Viele Gründe
motivieren diesen Schritt. Der internationalen Klimapolitik
fehlen trotz der bejubelten Pariser Vereinbarung von 2015
immer noch glaubwürdige Klimaschutzzusagen. Nur durch
eine Kraftanstrengung in letzterMinute gelang es der Euro-
päischen Union, diese Vereinbarung vor deren Inkrafttreten
zu ratifizierenunddadurcheinenGesichtsverlust durcheine
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Blamage abzuwenden. Inzwischen beobachten wir jedoch
Rekordwerte bei den globalen Temperaturen und der Kon-
zentration von Treibhausgasen in der Atmosphäre. Im Hin-
blick auf diesen eher labilen Zustand der Klimapolitik ent-
wickeln wir Aussagen, dass die Entscheidungen über Ener-
gie- und Klima künftig weniger von politischen Prozessen
sondern eher von disruptiven Innovationen gestalten wer-
den, die wiederum durch Business-Interessen unterstützt
werden.
Schlüsselwörter: Energiepolitik, Klimapolitik, Pariser
Abkommen
1. Introduction
Several events recommend taking stock and assessing the
current state of climate policy, which is closely tied to en-
ergy policy. The latest episode is the turnaround in the
related policy design of the United States by the Trump
administration. This decisive policy change by the sec-
ond biggest greenhouse gas emitter might overshadow in-
creasing internal conflicts by the third biggest emitter, the
European Union, which struggles with making its targets
for emissions, renewables, and energy efficiency effective.
Then there is emerging evidence that the Paris Agreement
[1], the hailed global climate treaty that was adopted in
2015 and became effective only a year later, is extremely
vulnerable because of its fully voluntary design.
We start with a reflection of the current state of climate
policy and come up with second thoughts about the seem-
ing progress in emissions reductions and policy commit-
ments. By providing empirical evidence about the drivers
of emissions in China, the United States, and the European
Union, we prepare the ground for upgrading our under-
standing of climate and energy policy from level 1.0 to 2.0.
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2. A Second View on Climate Policy
The dynamics of climate change, the reported evidence
about it, and the policy responses seem to be simple at
a first glance but turn out to be increasingly sobering after
a second view.
2.1 Signs of Seeming Progress
At a first glance, wemight discover signs of an encouraging
progress: Global greenhousegas emissions appear tohave
been stable over the past three years; China, the biggest
emitter, might already have peaked its emissions; the Eu-
ropean Union reached its 20 percent emissions reduction
target for 2020 by achieving a 24 percent decline compared
to 1990 already in 2015 [2]. A second view, however, re-
vealsevidenceof increasingconcern [3]. Whatmight at first
look like an indicator of structural changes towards a low-
energy and low-carbon economy actually reflects the on-
going economic slowdown in the industrialized countries
– like the United States and the European Union – that has
hit China’s exports.
International climate policy seems to have succeeded
in 2015 with the Paris Agreement, a second try after the ill-
fated Kyoto Protocol of 1997. This new international climate
agreement put forward goals of keeping global warming
“well below” 2°C and to “pursue efforts” to limit warm-
ing to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the
century. The current commitments of the countries, con-
tained in theso-calledNationallyDeterminedContributions
(NDCs), would lead to temperature increases beyond 3°C.
2.2 Climate Policy at the Cross-Roads
With the election of Donald Trump in the United States as
the next president, who has openly questioned the merits
of any climate policy, the prospects of a global multilateral
climate strategy have become doomed again. These rather
discouraging prospects coincide with the fact that 2016was
the year with thewarmest global surface temperature since
instrument based measurements are available.
Thus, the interim result of this stock taking is rather
sobering, since the gap between the need for actions and
the effective policy decisions seems to be widening. A Pen-
tagon report [4] states that “Global climate changewill have
wide-ranging implications for U.S. national security inter-
ests over the foreseeable future because it will aggravate
existing problems — such as poverty, social tensions, en-
vironmental degradation, ineffectual leadership, and weak
political institutions — that threaten domestic stability in
a number of countries.”
Continuing this stock taking in thearenaof policymaking
reveals even more signs of concern. International climate
policy, despite the Paris Agreement of 2015, is still lacking
credible commitments. Only a last minute effort for ratify-
ing this agreement before it entered into force saved the
European Union from a disgraceful loss of face. The Eu-
ropean Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is far from its
intended role as the pillar of EU climate policy [5]. Ongoing
efforts for adecisive reformso far have failedbecauseof the
diverging interests of Member States. The EU roadmaps
for 2050 [6] seem to have lost their momentum.
3. Scanning the Facts
Many controversies about the design of energy and climate
policy seem to be ill-fated because of the lack of evidence-
based facts. This is in particular visible when the discus-
sions focus on targets before sufficient knowledge is ac-
quired on how these targets could be achieved.
3.1 The Size of the Problem
A brief summary of the facts of climate change serves as
a reminder of the size of the problem. In 2016 concentra-
tion of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere passed the 400
ppm threshold, a 42 percent increase compared to pre-in-
dustrial levels that is, in the scientific community, almost
unanimously considered as the trigger for the currently ob-
servable climate change. 2016 is the hottest year on record,
topping the record temperatures in the past decades and
outpacing any temperature increase in the past thousand
years. These temperature anomalies are accompanied by
extreme weather events, sea level rise, disappearance of
Polar sea ice, unprecedented coral bleaching, and disrup-
tions in the food chains.
It is these facts about climate change which motivate
efforts for abating greenhouse gas emissions and adapting
to inevitable climate change. The European Union, e.g.,
is committed to reducing these emissions by at least 40
percent by2030compared to1990 levels. This is considered
as amilestone of the European Council decision in 2009, to
reduce emissions by 80 – 95 percent by 2050 compared to
1990 volumes [5]. But the question remains if there is any
plausibility for achieving such a radical change in life styles
and economic activity that would be compatible with these
goals.
3.2 Essentials on the Drivers of Energy Use and
Emissions
Debates about climate policy too often start with haggling
about decarbonization targetswithout supplying strategies
that would underpin these targets. We provide therefore at
least some essential tools for a more credible argumenta-
tion.
Carbon emissions are ultimately driven by the choice of
technologies and the level of economic activity. This can
be explained by the following analytical relationship:
1. (emissions) = (emissions intensity) x (energy intensity)
x (economic activity) with
(emissions intensity) := (emissions)/(energy)
(energy intensity) := (energy)/(economic activity)
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Figure 1: GreenhousegasemissionsofEU-28– impactof technologiesandeconomicactivity (OwncalculationsbasedonEurostatdata)
Figure 2: GreenhousegasemissionsofUnitedStates – impactof technologiesandeconomicactivity (OwncalculationsbasedonEurostatdata)
Figure 3: GreenhousegasemissionsofChina– impactof technologiesandeconomicactivity (OwncalculationsbasedonEurostatdata)
We rewrite (1) by
2. (emissions) = (total intensity) x (economic activity) with
(total intensity) := (emissions intensity) x (energy inten-
sity) =
= (emissions)/(economic activity)
The energy intensity is ameasure for energy efficiency. The
emissions intensity reflects the carbon intensity of the en-
ergymix, i.e. thecompositionof fossil fuelsand theshareof
renewables and nuclear energy. These relationships hold
for any type and scale of economic activity. We are con-
sidering national scales with economic activity measured
by gross domestic product (GDP) in volume terms. These
relationships can be visualized in graphs that reveal a lot
about the drivers of greenhouse gas emissions.
We start with evidence for the European Union in Fig-
ure 1. The left chart indicates that the total intensity of
emissions declined by 49 percent between 1990 and 2015,
which results from a 35 percent reduction of the energy
intensity and a 14 percent reduction of the emissions in-
tensity. The right chart adds to the reducing impact of the
total intensity the expanding impact of economic activity
measured by GDP, which grew by 25 percent between 1990
and 2015. Adding to the positive GDP growth, the negative
total intensity impact explains the decline of emissions of
24 percent after 1990. Obviously the main driver for emis-
sion reduction in the European Union is the improvement
of energy intensity, which is mainly due to the vast poten-
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tial for improving the energy efficiency in the newMember
States.
Figure 2 provides a similar analysis for theUnitedStates.
The left chart reveals that the 43 percent decline of the total
intensity results from a 37 percent improvement of energy
intensity but only a 6 percent contribution of emissions in-
tensity because of the rather modest impact of renewables
so far. The right chart adds to the total intensity the impact
of the substantial 48 percent GDP growth, thus causing a 5
percent increase of emissions.
China exhibits, as can be seen from Figure 3, a com-
pletely different emissions path. Total intensity has de-
clined by 69 percent because of a 58 percent reduction of
energy intensity and a 11 percent reduction of emissions in-
tensity. Outstanding, however, is the almost triplication of
GDP by 298 percent. This explains the 229 percent increase
of China’s emissions over the past 26 years. The remark-
able big improvement of energy efficiency in China is still
not matched by a similar improvement in the emissions
intensity despite heavy investments into renewables.
For comparison we add Austria in Figure 4. Our analysis
reveals that Austria could only keep emissions stable be-
tween 1990 and 2015, since the 37 percent GDP expansion
was matched by the same improvement of the total inten-
sity of emissions. In contrast to all other countries listed in
Figure5, Austriaexhibits ahigher improvement in theemis-
sions intensity than in the energy intensity. This might hint
to policies that give more emphasis to renewables than to
energy efficiency policies.
We complement our analysis of the drivers for green-
house gas emissions with Figure 5, which, apart from the
top emitters of the European Union, includes also Austria
and Switzerland together with theUnited States and China.
Acareful interpretationof thenumbers isneeded. InPoland
and the Czech Republic, the high decline in energy intensity
is due to the high potential for energy efficiency, but in the
United Kingdom also due to relocation of energy intensive
industries. Together with the Netherlands, Austria excels
in shifting the energy mix to renewables. Despite having
coined the term “Energiewende”, Germany has still a high
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potential for improving its emissions intensity because of
the heavy dependence on coal for electricity generation.
4. Switching Energy and Climate Policy from
Level 1.0 to 2.0
Our stock taking of the current state of energy and climate
policy and the evidence-based insights about the ongoing
transition in various countries give some guidance on how
we could proceed, or to put it into a familiar wording, how
we could switch energy and climate policy from level 1.0 to
2.0.
4.1 Proposition 1: Rely not Only on International
Policy Designs
This proposition holds for the activities under the United
Framework Convention of Climate Change with the Paris
Agreement because of the fragility of its design and gover-
nance. This also holds for the energy and climate targets
agreed upon in the European Union, since they represent
rather the small set of common interests than ambitious
efforts to move to a low-energy and low-emissions en-
ergy system. More ambitious Member States should have
no problems in fulfilling their contributions within the EU
framework.
4.2 Proposition 2: Discover the Potential Benefits
from Breakthrough Technologies
It is not primarily the substitution of fossil energy by re-
newables but the emerging huge potential in application
and transformation technologies which will drive the tran-
sition to low-energy and low-emissions structures [7]. The
stock of buildings able tobecome, to a largeextent, not only
energy self-sufficient but also even net-suppliers of energy
deserves priority. The current transport sector could evolve
into a comprehensive mobility system with full-electrifica-
tion being only one feature in an integration of all modes
of mobility. Energy intensive industries, like steel and ce-
ment, need to be understood as suppliers of infrastructure
for a low-energy and low-carbon economy.
4.3 Proposition 3: Consider the Business
Opportunities from Supporting the Transition
to a Low-energy and Low-carbon Economy
Extremely successful companies, like Apple, Google, and
Amazon, demonstrate the potential of business opportu-
nities that emerge in a phase of transition, be it tools for
communication, access to information, or retailing goods
and services. This is already visible in the switch to renew-
ables which in 2015 outpaced fossils and nuclear by a ratio
of 9 to 1 in installed new capacity [8]. Additive manufactur-
ing, better known as 3D printing, will be a disruptive factor
for industrial production. Sharing capital intensive goods
such as cars will change the idea of ownership in particular
if these cars become self-driving.
It will be the discovery of these business opportunities
and their comprehensive carbon management which will
be the ultimate driver to economic structures that aremuch
more resource effective and in addition extremely low in
emissions. This is at least a highly plausible perspective at
the time when this paper is being written.
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